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BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

NO. 2013-CV-0123

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MARSHALL
FALL TERM 2013
ALFRED BRADLO, AN INDIVIDUAL,
Petitioner,
v.
XAVIER YUNGSTEIN, AN INDIVIDUAL,
Respondent.

ON APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF MARSHALL

SAMUEL BRAGG
LESLIE BROCKHOEFT
MATTHEW VINSON
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ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Whether a genuine issue of material fact on an intrusion upon
seclusion claim exists, when the claim is based upon photographs of a
fully clothed individual in the common area of a public restroom, taken
by an eyeglass styled camera that can photograph only what is readily
visible to the naked eye, in order to document and report a possibly contagious illness during a state of emergency.
II. Whether a genuine issue of material fact on a false light invasion of privacy claim exists, when the claim is based upon an individual’s false publications regarding a well-known celebrity, despite the individual having no direct knowledge as to the falsity of the publications,
and the individual limiting his publication to one general and two personal social media accounts.
III. Whether a genuine issue of material fact on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim exists, when the claim is based upon
distress caused by photographs and comments published via social media with an intended objective of alerting the public to a potentially
dangerous situation during a state of emergency, rather than inflicting
severe emotional distress.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Marshall County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in
favor of Appellee, Xavier Yungstein. The Marshall Court of Appeals for
the First District affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in case number
2012-MCV01-2580. The opinion of the court of appeals is contained in
pages 3–14 of the record.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The statement of jurisdiction is omitted in compliance with Section
1020(2) of the Rules for the 2013 John Marshall Law School Moot Court
Competition in Information Technology and Privacy Law.
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CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
RESTATMENT PROVISIONS
This case involves the application and interpretation of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.”
This case requires the application and interpretation of section
652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), which states: One who
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.
This case also involves the application and interpretation of the
Marshall False Light Invasion of Privacy Statute, which states: One
who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if: (a) the false light in which the other was placed
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
This case also involves the application and interpretation of Marshall Revised Code § 138(b), which states: One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if
bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 8, 2012, a major snowstorm ravaged the State of Marshall (the “State”). (R. at 4). The snowstorm was so severe that the
State issued a state of emergency. (R. at 4–5). Within the State, the
Marshall Pick Ski Resort (the “resort”) was snowed in by the storm, and
cut off from the outside world; however, the resort did retain communication capabilities with the outside world via e-mails and the Internet.
(R. at 4–5). The resort instituted state of emergency protocols in order
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to protect the health and safety of its patrons. (R. at 5). These protocols
directed resort patrons to report “theft, suspicious conduct, violence,
and/or any type of virus/illness” that another patron might have. (R. at
5) (emphasis added).
Xavier Yungstein (“Yungstein”) and Alfred Bradlo (“Bradlo”) were
both resort patrons snowed in by the storm. (R. at 4). Yungstein, an executive for Bongle Corp., was on vacation at the resort testing a new
Bongle product—the “Bongle Lens”—a wearable computer styled like
eyeglass frames that essentially functions as a face-mounted camera
able to photograph what the user can see with the naked eye. (R. at 4;
see R. at app. A). Bradlo, a famous, award-winning documentary
director, philanthropist, and goodwill ambassador for the United Nations, was also on vacation at the resort. (R. at 5). It was common
knowledge that Bradlo had just returned from a trip to Africa during
which he visited the “disease-ridden” country of Gatsuwana. (R. at 5).
On January 9th, Yungstein and Bradlo were dining separately at
the resort restaurant. (R. at 5). Over the course of the evening, a number of guests stopped at Bradlo’s table to congratulate him on his
awards and humanitarian work, as well as to ask for his autograph. (R.
at 5.). This irritated Yungstein, and he commented that Bradlo was a
phony and that Yungstein could not stand him. (R. at 5). At some later
point during the evening, Yungstein left the table to use the public restroom. (R. at 5). While washing his hands, Yungstein heard the sounds
of a person vomiting in a stall, and then saw Bradlo exit the stall into
the common area of the public restroom. (R. at 5). Bradlo was covered in
sweat, exhibited a bright red rash, and had what Yungstein believed to
be blood around his mouth and hands. (R. at 5) Yungstein was alarmed
by this, given the heightened state of emergency at the resort, and
sought to document Bradlo’s illness by photographing Bradlo’s symptoms with his Bongle Lens. (R. at 5). Yungstein asked if Bradlo was
okay. (R. at 5). Bradlo replied that he had just eaten something funny,
and then quickly exited the restroom. (R. at 5). Immediately after,
Yungstein acted on his concern for public health and safety, followed
the resort’s emergency protocols, and notified resort officials of Bradlo’s
illness. (R. at 5–6). Resort officials questioned Bradlo about the incident, but Bradlo stated his illness was the result of an allergic reaction.
(R. at 6). The resort did not confirm this medically, but Bradlo had mentioned specific dietary restrictions during dinner, which his waiter confirmed. (R. at 6). Nevertheless, the resort took precautionary measures,
advising Bradlo to stay in his room (R. at 6).
The next morning, Yungstein contacted resort administration to determine what safety measures the resort had instituted. (R. at 6). The
resort administration assured him that it had investigated the incident
and found no reason to worry, but gave him no details as to Bradlo’s
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claim that the illness was the result of an allergic reaction or to the resort’s precautionary suggestion that Bradlo confine himself to his room.
(R. at 6). Unsatisfied with this response, Yungstein posted the pictures
of Bradlo on his personal Facebook and Twitter accounts as well as the
resort’s Facebook account with comments such as: “Alfred Bradlo is carrying a deadly disease but Marshall Pick cares more about protecting
his image than protecting the health of its guests” and “the great humanitarian is happy to share his experiences and his disease with the
rest of the world!” (R. at 6).
These posts caused a panic to spread through the resort, and eventually the posts spread to the outside world via social media. (R. at 6).
Bradlo and his family received hate messages and threats to their safety via their personal social media pages, resort guests gathered and
shouted outside his room, angry citizens vandalized Bradlo’s personal
residence in Marshall City, and protestors called for the boycott of his
current documentary. (R. at 6).
For Bradlo’s safety, the resort quarantined him to his room until
the storm subsided and a group of infectious disease physicians could
visit the resort to confirm that his illness was, in fact, the result of an
allergic reaction. (R. at 6). Once the physicians determined that it was
an allergic reaction and not a deadly contagious disease, Bradlo returned home. (R. at 6). However, since the incident, Bradlo has suffered
from depression and anxiety attacks requiring him to enroll in weekly
counseling and to take anti-depressants. (R. at 6, 8). Also, Bradlo has
claimed a significant loss of reputation as a result of Yungstein’s posts.
(R. at 8).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 1, 2012, Bradlo filed suit against Marshall Pick Ski
Resort and Yungstein in Marbury County Circuit Court alleging (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) false light; and (3) intentional infliction of
emotional distress. (R. at 2, 7). Marshall Pick settled, and Yungstein
moved for summary judgment pursuant to MARSHALL R. CIV. P. 56(c).1
(R. at 7). The circuit court granted Yungstein’s motion on all three
causes of action. (R. at 7).
Bradlo appealed the trial court’s judgment to the First District
Court of Appeals. (R. at 2). In an opinion and order dated May 13, 2013,
the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary
judgment as to all three causes of action. (R. at 14).
1.

Marshall R. Civ. P. 56(c) mirrors Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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This Court granted leave to appeal on July 15, 2013. (R. at 2).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The First District Court of Appeals properly affirmed the circuit
court’s grant of summary judgment because Bradlo did not raise a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to any of the three pled
causes of action.
Bradlo did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on his intrusion upon seclusion claim. First, Bradlo had no reasonably objective expectation of privacy because Yungstein photographed him in a public
space: the common area of a public restroom. Second, Yungstein’s actions were not highly offensive to a reasonable person because the intrusion was minor and he acted with a legitimate objective. Third,
Bradlo’s damages were not the result of the actual act of taking the
photographs; rather, his damages resulted from the photograph’s publication. Because the tort of intrusion upon seclusion requires an offensive violation of a reasonably objective expectation of privacy through
conduct and not publication, the court of appeals properly held that
summary judgment was appropriate on the intrusion upon seclusion
claim.
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment serves as a defense against State tort suits that involve publication (e.g., statutory
State torts of false light invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of
emotional distress). To overcome this defense, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s speech was factual, false, and published
with actual malice. First, Bradlo cannot prove that Yungstein acted
with actual malice because he neither knew nor acted with reckless disregard as to the falsity of his publication. Second, within the social media context, Bradlo’s posts, though factual allegations, were opinions as
a matter of law. The posts were intended as a warning, but the hyperbolic language within the posts rendered them unreliable. Because
Bradlo cannot overcome a First Amendment challenge, the court of appeals properly held that summary judgment was appropriate on both
the false light invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims.
Bradlo did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on his false
light invasion of privacy claim. First, within the social media context,
Yungstein’s posts were not communicated to the public at large; rather,
they were disseminated to a limited number of individuals. Second, the
posts, while unflattering, did not have a sufficiently negative association to be considered highly offensive to a reasonable person. Because of
these evidentiary showings, the court of appeals properly held that
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summary judgment was appropriate on the false light claim.
Bradlo did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. First, Yungstein’s conduct
was not extreme and outrageous enough to be considered atrocious and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Second, Yungstein did not
intend to harm Bradlo, nor did Yungstein recklessly disregard a high
probability that his actions would lead to Bradlo’s distress. Third,
though Bradlo did experience emotional distress, his reaction was exaggerated and unreasonable. Because Bradlo overreacted to Yungstein’s
conduct, which was not extreme and outrageous or intended to cause
harm, the court of appeals properly held that summary judgment was
appropriate on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
This Court should affirm the court of appeals in all respects.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
The circuit court properly resolved this case by granting summary
judgment in Yungstein’s favor on all three of Bradlo’s claims. Appellate
courts review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Malmloff v. Kerr,
879 N.E.2d 870, 873 (Ill. 2007); (R. at 7). On review, the court determines whether there exist any genuine issues of material fact, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, where
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MARSHALL R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
The right to privacy is the right “to be let alone.” See Thomas C.
Cooley, Law of Torts 29 (2d ed. 1888). The common law right to privacy
traces its origins back to a seminal law review article written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wherein they argued that with the
progression of technology, the law of torts must rise and expand to protect citizens from invasions of privacy. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4. HARV. L. REV. 193, 211 (1890). Building on this analysis,
Dean William L. Prosser distilled four specific torts that constituted an
invasion of privacy:
(1) Intrusion upon seclusion;
(2) Public disclosure of private facts;
(3) Publicity placing a person in a false light; and
(4) Misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness.
D. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). These four
torts were adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts in sections
652A–652E.
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Distinct from these four privacy torts is the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). This tort was originally adopted
as a "gap-filler" tort to allow for recovery in those rare instances where
a defendant inflicts severe emotional distress in a manner so unusual
that the victim has no other recognized theory of redress. See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 450 (Tex. 2004).
I. YUNGSTEIN DID NOT INTRUDE UPON BRADLO’S SECLUSION BY
PHOTOGRAPHING BRADLO IN A PUBLIC PLACE IN RESPONSE TO
EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES.
Yungstein photographing of Bradlo was not an intrusion upon seclusion because Yungstein photographed him in the common area of a
public restroom (i.e., a public place), and the emergency circumstances
in which Yungstein took the photographs negated any offensiveness.
Because the State of Marshall has adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (1977) for invasion of privacy cases, specifically § 652B for intrusion upon seclusion, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment as Bradlo failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any
of the elements necessary to establish the claim. Although Yungstein
need only refute one element of the claim to prevail, Bradlo’s claim
must fail because he cannot establish:
(1) that an intentional, unauthorized intrusion occurred into a matter in which he had a reasonable expectation of privacy;
(2) that the intrusion occurred in a manner highly offensive to a
reasonable person; and
(3) that the intrusion caused anguish and suffering.
Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1072 (Cal. 2009); (R. at
7); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
A. Bradlo Had No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Common
Area of a Public Restroom.
Bradlo had no reasonable expectation of privacy because Yungstein
photographed him in the common area of a public restroom, as opposed
to the restroom stall. A reasonable expectation of privacy is the touchstone of the intrusion upon seclusion tort, and without an objectively
reasonable expectation of seclusion or solicitude, it is impossible to prevail on a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. Fletcher v. Price Chopper
Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 878 (8th Cir. 2000). The right to
privacy is an inherently mental interest; therefore, the focus of this tort
is not to prevent any and all intrusions, but to address the specific intrusions that invade privacy and interfere with an individual’s mental
well-being. See D. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). As
such, to establish an intrusion requires the plaintiff not only to show
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the penetration of some physical or sensory zone surrounding the plaintiff, but also to show that the penetrated zone was mentally protected
by a reasonable expectation of privacy. Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998). In order for the law to protect
an interest in seclusion, the plaintiff must have an actual expectation of
seclusion or solitude, and that expectation must be objectively reasonable. PETA v. Bobby Bersoni, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1279 (Nev. 1995).
A plaintiff cannot establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a place unless he can show that (1) the extent to which other
persons had access to the subject place, and could see or hear the plaintiff, (2) the identity of the intruder, and (3) the means of intrusion collectively point towards an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable. Hernandez, 211 P.3d at 1073.
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public space. Hill
v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 648 (Cal. 1994) (In Bank); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. c. “The first element [of intrusion upon
seclusion] is not met when the plaintiff has merely been observed, or
even photographed or recorded, in a public place.” Sanders v. ABC, 978
P.2d. 67, 71 (Cal. 1999). In other words, to the extent that the public
has access to the subject place and can readily see or hear the plaintiff,
there is no expectation of privacy. See generally Hernandez, 211 P.3d
1063. In the common area of a public restroom, where it is expected
that any conduct will be observed by other individuals in the restroom,
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. Craig v. M & O Agencies,
Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v.
Billings, 858 F.2d 617, 618 (10th Cir. 1988)). For example, in Craig, the
plaintiff entered a restaurant restroom after fielding several sexual advances from her boss. Id. at 1052. Her boss followed her into the restroom. Id. The plaintiff, who had taken refuge in the stall, exited the
stall, and her boss approached her and kissed her. Id. When another
patron entered the restroom, plaintiff’s boss quickly exited. Id. Plaintiff
brought suit against her boss for, inter alia, assault, battery, and invasion of privacy. Id. at 1053. The court upheld summary judgment
against the invasion of privacy claim because plaintiff “had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common area of the restroom, where
she would expect her conduct to be observed by other individuals in the
restroom.” Id. at 1060–61. It did not matter that her boss made an unwanted, intentional intrusion because he “only entered the common area of the restroom” where she had no expectation of privacy. Id.
It is improper for a plaintiff to rely on the minority rule that a limited though existent expectation of privacy entitles the plaintiff to some
degree of privacy protection. Sanders, 978 P.2d. at 72;
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see e.g., Shulman, 955 P.2d at 494. An individual, visible to a limited
group of persons, but not the public at large, is entitled limited privacy
protection only against the secret surveillance of his actions or conversations. See Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, 306 F.3d 806, 815
(9th Cir. 2002). The majority rule that there is no expectation of privacy
in a public space provides more mainstream privacy protections than
the minority rule that protects broad-reaching privacy interests. Id.
(holding that the Arizona Supreme Court would not recognize as broad
of a privacy interest as the limited privacy approach adopted by the
California Supreme Court).
Under either approach, there is no expectation of privacy when the
observation of an intruder is to be expected and the method of intrusion
is equivalent to a public viewing or hearing rather than secret surveillance. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 494. For example in Shulman, the court
found media presence and filming of plaintiff, an accident victim, at a
publicly visible accident scene would be reasonably expected, destroying
any semblance of privacy. Id. It drew a distinction, however, between
using a camera to record publicly visible events and using a microphone
to amplify and record plaintiff’s conversation with responding emergency medical personnel. Id. The court found that mere presence at the accident scene along with recording plaintiff’s conversation did not constitute an intrusion upon plaintiff’s expectation of privacy, but the
microphone amplification of the conversation that made it audible was
a possible intrusion. Id. Although there was no expectation of privacy
between plaintiff and the limited group of emergency personnel, the
majority of what was said was inaudible to the public at large, and,
therefore, was protected by an expectation of limited privacy. Id.
In the current case, the alleged intrusion took place in the common
area of a public restroom. (R. at 5). Like the plaintiff in Craig, another
patron could easily have seen Bradlo. See 496 F.3d at 1061. In fact, not
knowing who was exiting the stall and having no direct personal relationship with Bradlo meant that, although Yungstein knew who Bradlo
was, their interaction was just the interaction of two normal restroom
patrons. (R. at 5). Being outside of the restroom stall and visibly accessible to the general public removed any reasonable expectation of privacy. Further, Yungstein did not intrude further into the restroom by photographing Bradlo while he was in the stall; instead, Yungstein “only
entered the common area of the restroom,” and photographed Bradlo
only after he exited the stall where it was reasonable to expect that his
conduct would be readily observable to any individual in the restroom.
See Craig, 496 F.3d at 1061.
Also, Bradlo does not establish a limited expectation of privacy scenario. Even under this broad protective standard, a limited expectation
of privacy requires an intrusion to be more than mere presence and
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observation. Unlike the media in Shulman, Yungstein did not use technology to amplify or enhance his alleged intrusion into plaintiff’s seclusion; rather, Yungstein took a quick photograph of what would have
been plainly visible to the naked eye of any member of the public. See
955 P.2d at 494. Thus, Bradlo had no reasonable expectation of privacy
whatsoever in the common area of the restroom.
B. A Reasonable Person Would Not Strongly Object to Yungstein’s
Actions during a State of Emergency.
A reasonable person would not find Yungstein’s act of photographing Bradlo highly offensive because the ski lodge was in a state of
emergency and Yungstein photographed Bradlo in a minimally intrusive fashion with the legitimate objective of capturing evidence of Bradlo’s illness. Determining whether an intrusion is “highly offensive” to a
reasonable person involves a policy determination under the particular
circumstances and context of the intrusion, and where a reasonable
person would not strongly object, there is no liability. Hernandez, 211
P.3d at 1072; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. d. Simply
because analysis under the reasonable person standard is context specific and ordinarily an issue of fact, judgment as a matter of law is not
precluded. See Boring v. Google Inc., 362 Fed.Appx. 273, 280 (3d Cir.
2010) (“claim for intrusion upon seclusion fails as a matter of law, because the alleged conduct would not be highly offensive to a person of
ordinary sensibilities.”); Swarthout v. Mutual Service Life Ins. Co., 632
N.W.2d 741, 745 (Ct. App. Minn. 2001) (citing Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 817 (N.D. 1998) (finding the reasonable
person standard becomes a question of law if reasonable person could
draw only one conclusion from the evidence).
A determination of offensiveness requires consideration of all the
circumstances of the intrusion, including its degree and setting and the
intruder’s motives and objectives. Shulman 955 P.2d at 494.2 An intrusion does not rise to the level of highly offensive unless (1) the intrusion
is likely to cause serious harm to the emotional sensibilities of the victim, and (2) there is an absence of countervailing, legitimate social interests at play, which would render the conduct inoffensive (e.g., a legitimate public interest in “reporting theft, suspicious conduct, violence,
2. A full list of factors includes: (1) the degree of the intrusion, (2) the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion, (3) the intruder's motives and objectives, (4) the setting of the intrusion, and (5) the plaintiff’s expectations of privacy. Hill,
865 P.2d at 648 (Cal. 1994) (adopting the approach established in Miller v. National
Broadcasting Co., 87 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1483–84 (1986).
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and/or any type of virus/illness that a visitor may have”). (R. at 5) (emphasis added); Hill, 865 P.2d 633, 648; see Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts §117 at 856 (5th ed. 1984) (proposing facts be evaluated in
light of the means and purpose of intrusion).
i. Yungstein’s photographing of Bradlo was at most a minor
intrusion that would not warrant a strong objection.
A minor degree of intrusion does not warrant a strong objection
from a reasonable person: “The law of privacy is not intended for the
protection of any shrinking soul who is abnormally sensitive about such
publicity.” D. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 397 (1960). Simply
because an individual’s physical state, presence, or actions in a public
place are embarrassing does not make photographing the individual a
highly offensive intrusion. Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 613 (7th
Cir. 2013). Rather, intrusion upon seclusion imposes liability based on
the particular method and degree of intrusion into a private matter, not
the content of the information obtained. See Koeppel v. Speirs, 808
N.W.2d 177 (Iowa 2011). The degree and setting of intrusion is logically
encompassed by the location, duration, and scope of the surveillance efforts. Hernandez, 211 P.3d at 1072; see e.g., Johnson v. Allen, 613
S.E.2d 657, 659–61 (Ga. App. 2005). In Johnson, an office manager
placed a camera above the stall in a woman’s restroom in response to
rumors that drugs were being sold in the restroom. Id. at 659. The camera remained in place for over two years, possibly invading the privacy
of more than twenty women. Id. The court found that the use of the restroom, as it occurs in the stall, was a private act. Id. at 660. Plus, because the surveillance was continuous over a long period rather than for
a short duration, and because the surveillance invaded the privacy of all
patrons rather than just those making inappropriate use of the restroom, the court held that the surveillance constituted a highly offensive intrusion. Id. at 661. The court analyzed the location, duration, and
scope of the surveillance, and held that the observation would surely be
offensive to the reasonable person. Id.
In the case at hand, Yungstein’s alleged intrusion was minimal in
location, duration, and scope, and made in response to an emergency
situation. First, Yungstein’s surveillance of Bradlo was minimal because it occurred in a public place, occurred quickly over a short duration, and was limited in scope to observing Bradlo’s illness. (R. at 5). Also, if Bradlo’s objection was not to being photographed in common area
of the restroom but that the intrusion was photographing him while he
was ill, it is the nature of the intrusion and not the content that results
that makes an intrusion highly offensive. As such, the court should analyze the method and degree of intrusion. Unlike the surveillance in
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Johnson, these photographs were taken outside of the stall in the common area of the restroom, a much less private area. See 613 S.E.2d 657,
659–61. In addition, Yungstein’s surveillance consisted of photographs
rather than continuous recording making the intrusion much less offensive. And finally, the surveillance was limited in scope because, unlike
in Johnson, the behavior that the alleged intruder was attempting to
observe and record was already known and pertained to a specific individual. See id. Yungstein did not need to cast a broad and continuous
net to obtain the information about Bradlo’s illness. As such, the intrusion was minimal and a reasonable person would not strongly object.
ii. Yungstein acted with the legitimate objective of protecting public
health and safety by reporting a virus/illness during a declared
emergency.
When a matter affects the health and safety of the public, the matter loses its wholly private character and can be made to yield when an
appropriate public need is demonstrated. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494,
504 (Alaska 1975). In fact, highly offensive intrusions like harassment
and prurient curiosity can be justified if made with the legitimate motive or objective of protecting public health and safety. See Shulman
955 P.2d at 494 (finding that the legitimate motive of pursuing a socially important story justified some otherwise tortious intrusions by the
media).
Further, less offensive intrusions require less justification; the intruder’s legitimate objective need only provide “reasonable justification”
or demonstrate “beneficial motivation” to negate the minor offensive nature of the tort. Hernandez, 211 P.3d at 1080. The Hernandez court
found that video surveillance, limited to three occasions, specifically designed only to capture abnormal activity, could easily be justified. Id..
The defendant, the facility director of a children’s center operated to
provide a residence for neglected and abused children, placed a camera
to monitor the nighttime activity of a computer lab when it was discovered that the lab was being used to view pornography. Id. at 1068–69.
The court found that the intrusion was minimal and was justified because the surveillance was performed with the beneficial motivation of
protecting the wholesome environment developed for the abused children, shielding them from exposure that might aggravate their vulnerable state. Id. at 1080.
Even if Yungstein’s intrusion was highly offensive to a reasonable
person, this fact is mitigated by Yungstein’s legitimate motive and objective of capturing an image of Bradlo’s illness to report it to hotel
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authorities in an attempt to protect public health and safety. The State
of Marshall issued a state of emergency, and the resort instituted emergency protocols placing all guests on high alert. (R. at 4–5). The protocol
obligated guests to report any activity in relation to viruses or illnesses
placed a burden for the public interest on all hotel guests. (R. at 5).
Yungstein, upon seeing Bradlo sick in the restroom, simply took pictures to fulfill the societal obligation. (R. at 5–6). Similar to the defendant in Hernandez, Yungstein was acting with a legitimate objective. See
211 P.3d at 1080. In Yungstein’s perception, Bradlo had just returned
from a foreign “disease-ridden” country and was now exhibiting signs of
illness. It was an essential social responsibility to report this; he photographed him in light of a prevailing public interest. Thus, even if a reasonable person would have objected to Yungstein’s behavior, the legitimate public interest negated any tortious element.
C. Bradlo’s Allegations of Anguish and Suffering Did Not Result from
the Taking of Photographs.
Bradlo’s alleged damage to his reputation and his need for weekly
counseling and anti-depressants following the incident were not the result of Yungstein taking his photograph. To succeed in a claim of intrusion upon seclusion, a plaintiff must prove the intrusion caused anguish
and suffering; however, a plaintiff fails to state a claim for intrusion
upon seclusion where the resulting anguish and suffering flow from
publication or some other act rather than from the intrusion. Thomas v.
Pearl, 998 F.2d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Schmidt v. Ameritech
Illinois, 768 N.E.2d 303, 316 (Ill. App. 2002). The basis for intrusion upon seclusion is not publication or publicity; rather it is the intrusive and
offensive prying into another’s privacy. Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat.
Bank of Princeton, 126 Ill.2d 411, 417 (Ill. 1989); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. a. For example, in Thomas, the secret
recording of a phone conversation, though an intrusion, did not harm
the plaintiff because he was a participant. 998 F.2d at 452. It was not
until the conversations were published that plaintiff experienced any
harm, and as such, plaintiff’s harm flowed from the publication and not
the intrusion. Id. Injury resulting from the publication of photographs
is more appropriately evaluated under a claim of public disclosure of
private facts, which is not at issue, or false light invasion of privacy,
which is addressed next. See Lovgren, 534 N.E.2d at 989.
In Bradlo’s case, there is no proof to demonstrate that his anguish
and suffering resulted from the intrusion itself. Nothing in the way the
photographs were taken suggests that Bradlo should have experienced
any of the injuries he submitted to the court. (R. at 8). Similar to the
harm found in Thomas, the loss of reputation would not have flowed
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simply from being seen in the bathroom; rather it was the result of having the pictures and other information published. See 998 F.2d at 452.
At the time of the incident, Bradlo exhibited no objection or indication
that Yungstein’s quick observation and snapshots had injured him in
any way. (R. at 6). The resulting evidence of injury and the damage of
weekly counseling along with the need for anti-depressants do not align
with being asked if he was okay after vomiting, and having his picture
briefly taken. Thus, Bradlo failed to show that anguish and suffering
flowed from the intrusion.
Because Bradlo was photographed in a public place, where he had
no expectation of privacy, in a minimally intrusive fashion, for the legitimate purpose of protecting public health and safety, and showed no direct injury as a result of the intrusion, Bradlo failed to demonstrate any
element of the intrusion upon seclusion claim. Accordingly, summary
judgment in favor of Yungstein was proper on this element.
II. YUNGSTEIN’S SPEECH IS PROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
DEFEATING CLAIMS OF FALSE LIGHT AND IIED, BECAUSE HE DID NOT
POST TO FACEBOOK OR TWITTER WITH ACTUAL MALICE.
Yungstein’s posts were publications regarding a public figure, made
without actual malice, placing the posts under the protection of the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment specifically guarantees that the government
“shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const.
amend. I; See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (applying the Free Speech Clause to the various states through the Fourteenth Amendment). “It is a prized American privilege to speak one's
mind . . . on all public institutions.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment serves a defense to statutory State torts suits that involve publication including false light and IIED. U.S. Const. amend. I; Snyder v.
Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1211 (2011). Freedom of speech is a fundamental right of individual liberty, far outweighing alleged tortious inflictions of emotional distress or invasions of privacy. See Howell v. New
York Post Co., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 699, 705 (N.Y. 1993). To ensure this
fundamental right, the Supreme Court requires public figures3 alleging
3. “[A]n individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes
a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 351 (1974). “In Hustler, the parties did not dispute the classification of the religious
leader/television host as a public figure.” Holloway v. Am. Media, Inc., 2:12-CV-2216TMP, 2013 WL 2247990, at * f.n. 8 (N.D. Ala. May 22, 2013). Similarly, it is not at dispute
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false light or IIED to demonstrate the publication was factual, false,
and made with “actual malice” before overcoming a First Amendment
challenge. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988);
Holloway v. Am. Media, Inc., 2:12-CV-2216-TMP, 2013 WL 2247990
(N.D. Ala. May 22, 2013).
A. Yungstein had no Direct Knowledge of the Falsity of His Posts, and
Therefore didnot Post the Photographs and Comments with Actual
Malice.
The actual malice standard requires defendant to either have actual knowledge of the publication’s falsity or to have acted with reckless
disregard with respect to whether the publication was true. Falwell,
485 U.S. at 56 (1988). Also, negligent oversights and omissions will not
prove actual malice; rather, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant intentionally or recklessly disregarded the truth. See Howard v.
Antilla, 294 F.3d 244, 254 (1st Cir. 2002). Mere negligence or carelessness is not enough. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 288. Recklessness amounting
to actual malice may be found where a publisher fabricates an account,
makes inherently improbable allegations, or deliberately ignores evidence that calls into question his published statements. Levesque v.
Doocy, 560 F.3d 82, 92 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 684-85 (1989); St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968)).
A publication does not lose its First Amendment protection simply
because it is outrageous, shocking, embarrassing, or offensive. Holloway, 2013 WL 2247990. Actual malice is not inferred from ill will or
even intent to injure; rather, the entire focus is on the defendant’s
knowledge of the truth or falsity of the statements made. See State v.
Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 56 (Alaska 2007). The First Amendment does
not allow for censorship simply because a publication is offensive or
disagreeable. Snyder, 131 S.Ct. at 1215.
In order to overcome a motion for summary judgment, a public figure must prove, with convincing clarity, that a jury could find actual
malice. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). There
must be sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant
had serious doubts as to the truth of the publication but published it in
spite of these doubts. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731. That is to say, where
the defendant makes a publication that he believes to be true, there is
no actual malice. See Connaughton, 491 U.S. at 667; Holloway v. Am.
Media, Inc., 2:12-CV-2216-TMP, 2013 WL 2247990 (N.D. Ala. May 22,
2013). For example in Holloway, a tabloid, the National Enquirer,
that Bradlo, a famous movie director, philanthropist, and goodwill ambassador for the
United Nations is also a public figure. (R. at 3–4).
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published three articles concerning plaintiff’s missing daughter, giving
three different accounts of her death and burial. 2013 WL 2247990 at
*1. When plaintiff brought suit for IIED, the tabloid attempted to hide
behind the free speech protections of the First Amendment. Id. Because
of the outrageous nature and contradictory stories of each article, it was
clear that the Enquirer published the articles, which purported to convey facts, with knowledge of the articles’ falsity. Id. The court found
that the First Amendment did not bar plaintiff’s claim, stressing the
point that the tabloid had knowledge of the publications’ falsity sufficient to prove actual malice. Id. at *10.
Cases that find the First Amendment is not implicated by speech
on a private matter—such as a personal attack stemming from a preexisting relationship or conflict—are factually distinguishable from the
case at bar because these cases deal with the publication of matters of
public concern and not publication of matters regarding public figures.
See Snyder, 131 S.Ct. at 1217 (2011). When evaluating matters of public
concern, speech actually regarding a private matter loses its public nature and potentially loses the protection of the First Amendment. See
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). This rule is inapplicable,
however, when the publication concerns a public figure because “there
is a public interest which attaches to people who, by their accomplishments, mode of living, professional standing or calling, create a legitimate and widespread attention to their activities,” including actors, directors, and public officers. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal.App.3d
409, 422 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.,
201 Cal.App.2d 733, 746 (Ct. App. 1962)).
When this public interest attaches to public figures, speech regarding even their private matters is protected by the First Amendment.
Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 422 (finding that private romantic matters of Clint Eastwood, famous actor and director, were of public interest due to his celebrity status). For example in Falwell, Hustler released a publication concerning the plaintiff, a nationally known
minister, that outrageously portrayed him as having had an incestuous
affair with his mother in an outhouse. 485 U.S. at 56. Plaintiff brought
a claim for IIED. Id. Though this story, while obviously false, amounted
to a personal attack and spoke to highly private matters of the plaintiff’s life, the Court reasoned that the First Amendment gives citizens
the right to criticize public figures or address matters of public concern.
Id. at 51. Because the plaintiff was a public figure, the outrageous portrayal of private matters of his life were fair game for publication unless he could prove the publication’s falsity and that Hustler had acted
with actual malice. Id. at 56.
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Here it is clear that Yungstein’s Facebook and Twitter posts were
publications regarding Bradlo, a public figure. (R. at 6). This means
that Bradlo’s claims under the State of Marshall’s false light invasion of
privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress statutes implicate the First Amendment and cannot move forward without
overcoming this protection by demonstrating that Yungstein acted with
actual malice (i.e. knowledge or reckless disregard of the publications
falsity).
Bradlo cannot show this because Yungstein believed his posts to be
true. Unlike the publication in Holloway, Yungstein’s publication was
based on a serious of facts and inferences rather than purely fabricated.
See 2013 WL 2247990 at *1. There were no internal contradictions to
demonstrate that he acted with knowledge of the publication’s falsity.
Yungstein had no knowledge of his post’s falsity. Additionally,
Yungstein was in no position to have acted with reckless disregard because his posts were neither inherently improbable allegations nor
made while ignoring evidence that called the posts into question.
Yungstein posts were probable allegations because he based his conclusions on a series of true facts: (1) Bradlo had just returned from a disease-ridden country; (2) Bradlo was vomiting in the restroom and had a
red rash, both signs of illness; and (3) because of the emergency state,
an individual might misrepresent the reason for an apparent illness so
as to avoid attention or quarantine. (R. at 5–6). Yungstein had no evidence demonstrating his statements were false. Bradlo had represented
that he was sick from food poisoning, but this could possibly have been
an intentional misrepresentation. And, although the resort had informed him that there was no reason to worry, they did not provide him
with any further information uncovered in their investigation. (R. at 6).
He had no information to recklessly disregard. Thus, Bradlo was unable
to demonstrate that Yungstein acted with actual malice to overcome
First Amendment protections making it proper for this court to grant
summary judgment on both the false light and IIED claims.
B. In a Social Media Context, Yungstein’s Facebook and Twitter Posts
were Opinion Statements, not Factual Statements, and Therefore
Cannot be False.
Yunstein’s postings, though intended as factual warnings, when
examined in the context of a social media website posting, are merely
opinion statements, and therefore cannot be actionable statements under a State tort claim. See Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th
Cir. 1983) (“defense available in a defamation action that the allegedly
defamatory statements are opinions, not assertions of fact, is also available in a false light privacy action”). This is because a publication tort
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claim can only stand when the plaintiff can prove the falsity of the publication. Schoneweis v. Dando, 435 N.W.2d 666, 670 (Neb. 1989). Opinions cannot be proven false because they are reflections of a person’s
state of mind (i.e., ideas). Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972, 979 (N.J.
1994). And “[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339.
In determining whether a statement is fact or opinion, courts consider: (1) the broader social context surrounding the communication, including any applicable customs or conventions that might signal to
readers or listeners that the statement is likely opinion, not fact; (2) the
statement in its totality in the context in which it was uttered or published; (3) all the words used, not merely a particular phrase or sentence; and (4) all of the circumstances surrounding the statement, including the medium by which the statement is disseminated and the
audience to which it is published. Information Control Corp. v. Genesis
One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980); Edelman v.
Croonquist, CIVA 09-1938 (MLC), 2010 WL 1816180 at *6 (D.N.J. May
4, 2010). Though analysis occurs within the framework of these factors,
this is, in effect, a totality of the circumstances test. See Roe v. Doe, C
09-0682 PJH, 2009 WL 1883752, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2009).
Where the medium of communication as well as social context surrounding the communication strongly indicate that it is an opinion, it is
not enough that the words intend to relay a factual message. Weyrich v.
New Republic, Inc., 235 F.3d 617, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Because social
media pages and internet forums are often the medium for outrageous
claims, most visitors are aware of the unreliable nature of such posts.
Chaker v. Mateo, 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1148, (Ct. App. 2012). The
fiery, hyperbolic language present on such web pages, as contrasted
with the generally restrained tones of the media, direct the reader to
the conclusion that the words, which might be considered statements of
facts, are actually opinion statements. See Flotech, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 814 F.2d 775, 778 (1st Cir. 1987). For example in
Weyrich, the plaintiff brought a suit for false light invasion of privacy
because a political commentary journal published an article falsely
characterizing him as having the diagnosable mental condition of paranoia. 235 F.3d at 623. The article stated that the plaintiff suffered
“bouts of pessimism and paranoia” and had “habits of suspicion, pessimism, and antagonism,” but did so amidst caricatures of the plaintiff
and hyperbolic language describing an outburst as a “volcano of screaming.” Id. at 623. The court found that the medium of the article, a
“Weekly Journal of Opinion,” the context of political commentary, as
well as the hyperbolic rhetoric all indicated that the statement was an
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opinion despite the factually verifiable nature of a claim that the plaintiff was paranoid. Id. at 625.
Cases withdrawing the First Amendment shield from opinion
statements implying false assertions of fact are distinguishable from
the case at bar because these cases focus on statements that couch false
assertions within statements of opinion in order to avail the false assertions of unwarranted constitutional protection. See Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990). Simply because expressions of
opinion do not enjoy blanket constitutional protection, however, does
not mean that all opinions based on false facts are unprotected. Roe,
2009 WL 1883752, at *10. An opinion only loses its constitutional protection when it is “based on implied, undisclosed facts” and “the speaker
has no factual basis for the opinion.” Id. (quoting Ruiz v. Harbor View
Community Association, 134 Cal.App.4th 1456 (Ct. App. 2005)). For example in Roe¸ the defendant, while speaking on a talk radio broadcast,
hyperbolically portrayed a former employee as attempting to “rip [him]
off” by taking an early bonus, quitting his job, and taking up a new job
in violation of a non-compete agreement. 2009 WL 1883752, at *11. This
portrayal was based on assertions of fact alleged to be false. Id. Rather
than remove the protections of the First Amendment, the court instead
concluded that the average listener, because of the hyperbolic nature of
the portrayal and the unreliable venue of a talk radio broadcast, would
not assume the false assertions of fact, but rather would assume the entire broadcast was a statement of opinion. Id. at *11-12.
In the present case, the totality of the circumstances point to
Yungstein’s posts as being statements of opinion. Starting with an
analysis of the words used, it is clear that Yungstein’s speech was hyperbolic. (R. at 6). Like the publisher in Weyrich, Yungstein used fiery
language, stating that Bradlo was carrying a “deadly disease” and that
he would share the disease with the “rest of the world!” in order to disseminate the information about the illness, which would lead a reader
to believe the statement was an opinion. See 235 F.3d at 623. Next, the
mediums of publication were social media accounts, which in the typical
social context are inherently unreliable sources of fact. Also, the fact
that social media accounts were one of the few remaining modes of
communication between the resort and the outside world did not significantly alter this social context. (R. at 5).
Additionally, Yungstein’s statements were not false assertions of
fact couched in opinion. While his statements were based on undisclosed facts, Yungstein had a factual basis for his opinion that Bradlo
had a deadly disease. To reiterate, Bradlo had just returned from a disease-ridden country and Yungstein found him vomiting in the restroom,
covered in a red rash. (R. at 5-6). Like the result in Roe, the hyperbolic
rhetoric and unreliable medium both undercut the possibility that the
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statement would be taken as an assertion of fact. See, 2009 WL
1883752, at *11–12. Thus, Yungstein’s statements were, as a matter of
law, opinion.
III. YUNGSTEIN DID NOT CAST BRADLO IN A FALSE LIGHT BY POSTING
PHOTOGRAPHS AND COMMENTS TO FACEBOOK AND TWITTER IN A SOCIAL
MEDIA CONTEXT.
Yungstein’s posts were not a false light invasion of privacy because
in a social media context, posts generally are not given publicity, are
viewed as opinions despite being factual statements, and are not substantial enough to be highly offensive. Because the State of Marshall
has codified the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) for invasion of privacy cases, specifically § 652E for publicity placing a person in false
light, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment as Bradlo
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any of the elements
necessary to establish the claim. Although Yungstein need only refute
one element of the claim to prevail, Bradlo’s claim must fail because he
cannot establish:
(1) that the statement was given publicity;
(2) that the statement was false;
(3) that the statement would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person; and
(4) that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or
reckless disregard of the truth (i.e. actual malice).
Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1986); (R. at 9–10);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).4
A. Yungstein’s Facebook and Twitter Posts Were Not Given Publicity
because the Statements Were Not Substantially Certain to become
Public Knowledge.
Social media posts are disseminated on a limited basis rather than
being available to the public at large; therefore, social media posts are
not given publicity for the purposes of a false light claim. A plaintiff
cannot state a claim for false light without first proving that the matter
was given “publicity.” Machleder, 801 F.2d at 53. Mere publication is
not enough to show publicity; rather, the plaintiff must show that the
statement was communicated to the public at large or was initially so
widely disseminated that the matter was “substantially certain to
4.

Elements (2) and (4) are addressed in the previous section.
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become one of public knowledge.” Moore v. Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d
270, 273 (5th Cir. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652D,
cmt. a, 652E, cmt. a (1977) (regarding publicity as applicable to false
light). This approach is widely adopted, and courts have found that
communications targeted to small groups do not qualify as publicity.
Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 768 F.2d 1204, 1206–07 (10th Cir.
1985) (finding a credit report sent to seventeen subscribers did not constitute publicity); Grigorenko v. Pauls, 297 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448–49 (D.
Conn. 2003) (finding disclosure to twelve persons did not satisfy the
publicity element). The narrow dissemination of information does not
constitute publicity, and a defendant is not liable for the further spreading of word by interested persons the same way rumors are spread.
Wells v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
The examination of publicity on the Internet is unique because
the presumption of publicity does not attach to a website in the same
way it attaches to other forms of media. Philbrick v. eNom, Inc., 593 F.
Supp. 2d 352, 382 (D.N.H. 2009). This is because, unlike physical space,
cyberspace has no physical boundaries to easily define what is private,
and thus, cyberspace is not presumed to be public, but is instead composed of many private allotments—websites. Patricia Sanchez Abril,
Recasting Privacy Torts in A Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1, 20 (2007). Specifically, Facebook or Twitter posts, like many Internet
postings, are only viewable to those people that the operator of the page
selects, limiting the dissemination to a discrete number of individuals
rather than the public at large. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717
F. Supp. 2d 965, 980 (C.D.Cal.2010). For example in Philbrick, the court
found that the publicity requirement was not met simply because offensive material became accessible through plaintiff retailer’s website.
Philbrick, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 359. Plaintiff, a sporting goods retailer
and its owner, brought an action against a provider of domain name
registration services for false light invasion of privacy because the provider associated the retailer with the marketing and advertisement of
pornography. Id. at 381. The defendant had acquired the domain name
“philbricksports.com” with one less ‘s’ than the plaintiff’s website “philbrickssports.com,” and on the defendant’s website, if a user entered the
word “adult” into the search bar, the page listed a number of links to
sexually oriented websites. Id. at 359. The court found that the standard for publicity was not met because the association to the illicit advertisements could only be made by the limited viewers of the provider’s
website, and only if these viewers took specific actions to search for the
material. Id.
Additionally, a cause of action for false light cannot be predicated
on the further dissemination of the publication even where defendant’s
conduct might foreseeably result in media publicity. See LaFontaine v.
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Family Drug Stores, Inc., 360 A.2d 899, 902 (Com. Pl. 1976). This is because publications directed to a small, specific group, does not constitute a mass dissemination to the public at large. See Roe ex. rel. Roe v.
Heap, 2004-Ohio-2504, 2004 WL 1109849, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. May
11, 2004). For example in Roe, the defendant sent an email complaint
specifically directed to seven athletic officials who had the authority to
address her complaint. Id. The fact that she encouraged the recipients
to widely disseminate the information in the complaint did not make
her initial email dissemination to the public at large. Id.
In this case, Yungstein’s Facebook and Twitter posts were limited
in scope, not directly targeted to the public at large, and were therefore
not given publicity. Like the plaintiff in Philbrick, Bradlo cannot show
that Yungstein’s posts were available to more than the limited viewers
of Yungstein’s own social media accounts and the Marshall Pick Facebook account. See, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 359. Also, it is clear that
Yungstein’s post was targeted at the limited number of people at the resort in order to warn them of the possible dangers of Bradlo’s illness. (R.
at 6).
Additionally, Yungstein is not responsible for the further dissemination of his posts because the dissemination occurred in a fashion similar to the spread of rumors. Like the defendant in Roe, simply because
the posts were eventually disseminated to the public at large does not
give publicity to Yungstein’s original post. See 2004 WL 1109849, at
*12. Thus, Yungstein post was not given publicity.
B. The Photographs Posted by Yungstein Did Not Cast Bradlo in a
False Light That Would be Highly Offensive to a Reasonable Person.
Yungstein’s posts were merely unflattering and did not have a sufficiently negative or sexual association to be considered highly offensive
to a reasonable person. Courts have construed the highly offensive
standard narrowly in false light claims “in order to avoid a head-on collision with First Amendment rights.” Machleder, 801 F.2d at 57. In order to meet the highly offensive standard, the plaintiff has the heavy
burden of proving that the statements were such a reprehensible misrepresentation of his character, history, activities or beliefs that severe
offense may be reasonably expected. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652E, cmt. c (1977). Courts will not find statements to be highly offensive if there are minor mistakes in reporting or if the context makes the
statements questionable. Weyrich, 235 F.3d at 624. Moreover, the highly offensive standard is more narrowly construed for a public figure
than a private citizen because public figures, constantly subjected to the
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public eye, have a diminished expectation of privacy. Gertz, 418 U.S. at
351 (1974).
Facts that are merely unflattering, embarrassing, or offensive will
not meet the highly offensive standard. See Machleder, 801 F.2d at 58.
Rather, before a publication can be highly offensive it must be considerably more insulting, often portraying plaintiffs as victims of degrading
mistreatment, engaged in sexually promiscuous, immoral, or criminal
behavior, or as voluntarily involved with pornographic publications.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 378 (1967). See e.g., Douglass v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding Hustler Magazine’s unauthorized use of model's nude photograph and false portrayal
of her as a lesbian was highly offensive); Virgil v. Sports Illustrated,
424 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that facts portraying
professional athlete as putting out cigarettes in his mouth, hurting
himself in order to collect unemployment, fighting in gang fights as a
youngster, and eating bugs was not highly offensive)
Courts have not found cases involving diseases, illnesses, or sicknesses that do not have a negative or sexual association to be highly offensive. See Bitsie v. Walston, 85 N.M. 655, 658 (Ct. App. 1973); Strand
v. John C. Lincoln Health Network, Inc., CV-10-02112-PHX-NVW, 2011
WL 1253408, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2011). For example, in Stand, the
court held that a publication of a nurse’s latex allergy was not highly
offensive, distinguishing this sort of medical ailment with the implication of a venereal disease. Strand, 2011 WL 1253408, at *5. In Bitsie,
the use of a picture and name of a Navajo child was published in a local
newspaper in conjunction with a fundraiser for cerebral palsy, implying
that the child had the disease and at the time she was in good health.
Bitsie, 85 N.M. at 658. The court found that, even though the portrayal
was especially offensive in the Navajo culture, the implication would
not be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Id. at 659. On the other
hand, in Urbaniak v. Newton, the disclosure of a private citizen’s HIV
status was highly offensive, because HIV is “ordinarily associated either
with sexual preference or intravenous drug use. It ought not to be, but
quite commonly is, viewed with mistrust or opprobrium.” Urbaniak v.
Newton, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1140 (Ct. App. 1991).
Yungstein’s posts were not insulting enough to meet the highly offensive standard because a reasonable person could draw no negative or
sexual associations from the posts. Similar to the publication in Urbaniak, the posts did claim that Bradlo had a deadly disease. See 226
Cal. App. 3d at 1140. However, dissimilar to the publication,
Yungstein’s posts had no reference to a stigmatic health disorder like
HIV (a sexually transmitted disease). Id. Also comparable to Bitsie, it is
possible that Yungstein’s posts stigmatized Bradlo as having a contagious deadly disease, which might negative associations, especially
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within the context of the emergency circumstances that faced Marshall
Pick. See 85 N.M. at 658. But like the negative association in Bitsie that
was offensive only to the Navajo culture, the negative association of a
contagious disease would be only offensive to a limited number of resort
patrons and not a reasonable person. Additionally, Bradlo is a public
figure with a diminished expectation of privacy; therefore, he must
meet a higher burden than the already onerous highly offensive standard. Thus, Bradlo cannot show that the posts would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person.
IV. YUNGSTEIN DID NOT COMMIT IIED BY POSTING A PUBLIC WARNING,
NOT SPECIFICALLY AIMED AT INFLICTING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Yungstein’s posts did not constitute IIED because his conduct was
both reasonable (i.e., not extreme and outrageous) and not specifically
aimed at inflicting severe emotional distress while Bradlo’s reaction to
the posts was both exaggerated and unreasonable. Because the State of
Marshall has codified the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), the trial court correctly granted summary judgment as Bradlo failed to raise a genuine issue
of material fact as to any of the elements necessary to establish the
claim. Although Yungstein need only refute one element of the claim to
prevail, Bradlo’s claim must fail because he cannot establish:
(1) that the conduct involved was truly extreme and outrageous;
(2) that the conduct intentionally or had a high probability of inflicting severe emotional distress; and,
(3) that the conduct did in fact cause severe emotional distress.
Marshall Revised Code § 138(b) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 (1965); McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill.
1988); (R. at 11).
A. Yungstein’s Conduct Would Not Cause an Average Member of the
Community to Exclaim “Outrageous!”
Yungstein’s conduct did remotely approach the high bar set by
courts in an IIED claim because Yungstein had a legitimate objective,
and Bradlo was not particularly susceptible to harassment. Liability for
IIED is only possible where the plaintiff can show conduct so outrageous and extreme as to exceed all possible bounds of decency. Howell v.
New York Post Co., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. 1993); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. d. Typically liability is attached only
when the defendant has been in a special position to inflict mental
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suffering, and his behavior has been especially calculated to inflict it.
See McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 808; D. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of
Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 888 (1939). Courts
adopt this high standard in order to allow freedom of individual action
while providing reasonable opportunity for redress for victims of conduct that is determined to be “atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Tex.
1993). To demonstrate truly outrageous and extreme conduct, the court
must perform an initial objective analysis to determine whether the
conduct would arouse resentment in an average member of the community, leading him to exclaim: “Outrageous!” Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d
477, 490 (7th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is inappropriate only
where the court determines reasonable persons would differ on whether
the conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous to illicit this result. Security Nat. Bank, Edgeley v. Wald, 536 N.W.2d 924, 927 (N.D.
1995). Courts make this determination based on a non-exclusive list of
factors including (1) the legitimacy of the defendant’s objective, and (2)
the plaintiff’s susceptibility to harassment. Honaker, 256 F.3d at 491.5
Where the defendant reasonably believes that his objective is legitimate, the fact that the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional
distress does not ensure that defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. Id. Courts afford great latitude to a defendant pursuing a legitimate objective even if that pursuit results in distress for the plaintiff.
Pub. Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 360 N.E.2d 765, 768 (Ill. 1976). However, a legitimate objective does not justify conduct when there is no rational explanation for the conduct. Johnson v. Allen, 613 S.E.2d 657, 659 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2005). Surveillance and subsequent publication is considered
to have no rational explanation making it extreme and outrageous only
when it includes an element of perversion or sexual deviance. See
Sawicka v. Catena, 79 A.D.3d 848, 849–850 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010);
Johnson, 613 S.E.2d at 659. For example in Howell where there were no
such elements, the court found that the reporter’s legitimate objective
in obtaining and publishing a newsworthy photo justified the emotional
distress inflicted upon the plaintiff by its publication. 612 N.E.2d at
700. The plaintiff was a patient in a psychiatric facility, and by nature
of being a patient was highly susceptible to emotional distress. Id. A reporter trespassed onto the grounds of the psychiatric facility, took photographs of the plaintiff, and published the photographs revealing the
plaintiff’s mental illness to her friends, family, and the public at large.
Id. Whereas in Johnson where there were elements of perversion, the
5. Courts also analyze the degree of authority the defendant has over the plaintiff.
Honaker, 256 F.3d at 491. In this case, there is no relationship of authority between
Yungstein and Bradlo.
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court found that a camera hidden in the female employees’ restroom for
two years had no rational explanation. 613 S.E.2d at 659.
The defendant attempted to justify his actions by stating that he had a
legitimate objective in monitoring and preventing potential criminal activity occurring in the restroom, but the court reasoned that given the
private nature of the acts being spied upon, and the means of surveillance, that there was a reasonable inference that the camera was installed to spy on female employees. Id.
Celebrity status does not make an individual more susceptible to
harassment so as to outweigh the justification of actions stemming from
a legitimate objective. In fact, celebrity status lowers an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, and this constant exposure “tends to
make celebrities more ‘psychologically tolerant.’” Jamie E. Nordhaus,
Celebrities' Rights to Privacy: How Far Should the Paparazzi Be Allowed to Go?, 18 REV. LITIG. 285, 289–90 (1999). And the effect of lone
factor of being more susceptible to harassment does not overcome the
legitimacy of defendant’s objective because, though it is one factor, it is
a substantial one. Chen v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 99 C 6261, 2002 WL
1632412, at *9 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2002); Gibson v. Chem. Card Servs.
Corp., 510 N.E.2d 37, 38 (Ill. App. 1987) (finding employee’s IIED suit
not supported though employer, accused employee of criminal conduct,
demanded a confession, threatened her with prison time, and ultimately terminated her, because of an employer's legitimate interest in investigating and remedying employee wrongdoing).
In the case at bar, Yungstein’s posts were not extreme and outrageous. Like the defendant in Howell, Yungstein was pursuing a legitimate objective when he alerted the public about the possibility that
Bradlo was carrying a contagious illness. See 612 N.E.2d at 700. And
similar to the ruling in Gibson, here the legitimate objective of protecting the public greatly outweighs any tortious infliction of emotional distress. See 510 N.E.2d at 38. Additionally, unlike the defendant in Johnson, Yungstein’s surveillance of Bradlo in the restroom along with the
subsequent publication of the photographs had no perverse or sexually
deviant element. And unlike the plaintiff in Howell, Bradlo was not
highly susceptible to emotional distress. See 612 N.E.2d at 700. In fact,
because of his celebrity status, Bradlo likely had a higher physical tolerance than is ordinary. This means that though the legitimate objective would remove liability from Yungstein in general, it is now more
clear and certain that his actions were not so outrageous as to be considered atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
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B. Yungstein Had No Intention to Cause Bradlo Severe Emotional
Distress.
Yungstein’s posts were not specifically aimed at inflicting severe
emotional distress. A necessary element of an IIED claim is intent.
Marshall Revised Code 138(b). A claim for IIED cannot stand where the
actor did not act intentionally or recklessly to cause severe emotional
distress. McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 808. Demonstrating intent requires
proof that the defendant specifically aimed his behavior at inflicting severe emotional distress. See Honaker, 256 F.3d at 494. And demonstrating reckless disregard requires proof that the defendant acted with no
consideration of knowledge that his actions had a high probability of inflicting severe emotional distress. Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal.
Rptr. 668, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). Courts generally find the requisite
knowledge to act recklessly only when (1) the actions, by their very nature, are likely to cause severe distress, or (2) when the defendant has
some special knowledge that the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to
such distress making it more likely that certain actions would cause severe distress. Honaker, 256 F.3d at 494 (citing Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561
N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1990)). In Pavilon, the defendant
had a close relationship with the plaintiff that provided special
knowledge that the plaintiff was undergoing psychotherapy. 561 N.E.2d
at 1252. The court found that this relationship and special knowledge,
along with the fact that defendant was a trained psychotherapist, was
sufficient to show that the defendant acted with reckless disregard to
the high probability that any sexually harassing conduct would inflict
severe emotional distress. Id.
Yungstein neither intentionally nor recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress. First, as previously discussed, Yungstein acted with a
legitimate motive, not a motive of intentional harm. It is not enough for
Bradlo to point his finger at Yungstein’s dinner comment that Bradlo
was a phony and that Yungstein could not stand him to show intent. (R.
at 5). Second, in order to have acted recklessly, Yungstein would have
had to have disregarded a high probability that his actions would inflict
emotional harm. Unlike the defendant in Pavilon, Yungstein had no
special knowledge that would inform him of the high probability that
his actions would inflict severe emotional distress. In fact, the reactions
by the public at large in response to Yungstein’s posts are anything but
foreseeable, much less highly probable. It is unreasonable to assume
that a social media post could inspire such public backlash. Yungstein
did not specifically aim his actions at harming Bradlo, and neither did
he disregard the highly probable effects of his actions. Thus, Yungstein
did not have the required mental culpability of intent or reckless disregard.
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C. Bradlo’s Emotional Distress was an Unreasonable Reaction to
Yungstein’s Publication.
Yungstein’s Facebook and Twitter posts were of such a quality that
a reasonable person could be expected to endure them without distress.
A plaintiff cannot prevail on an IIED claim without proof of severe emotional distress. McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 809. Severe emotional distress
cannot be from an exaggerated or unreasonable reaction; rather, the
distress must be reasonable under the circumstances. Computer Publications, Inc. v. Welton, 49 P.3d 732, 736 (Okla. 2002). This means that a
plaintiff must not only prove with direct evidence the severity of his distress, but also that a reasonable person would, under the circumstances, exhibit similar levels of distress. See id.; Parkway Co. v. Woodruff,
901 S.W.2d 434, 445 (Tex. 1995). For example in Welton, where an exboyfriend stalked and harassed his ex-girlfriend for more than two
years causing her to become afraid, lose weight, and break out in a
rash, the court found that this presented clear evidence of severe emotional distress. 49 P.3d at 737. The court also looked at testimony revealing that the plaintiff was “not scared of anything,” and “had never
reacted that way to anything.” Id. Viewed as a whole, these facts proved
to the court that the plaintiff had not reacted in an exaggerated or unreasonable fashion, but instead had exhibited a reasonable level of emotional distress. Id.
In this case, Bradlo’s reaction was both exaggerated and unreasonable. Bradlo’s claims that his reputation suffered along with his need to
enroll in weekly counseling and take anti-depressants show his emotional distress. (R. at 8). Similar to the plaintiff in Welton, Bradlo can
directly prove that his reaction was, in fact, severe. See id. However,
dissimilar to the plaintiff in Welton, Bradlo cannot prove that the reaction he exhibited was on par with what a reasonable person might experience. See id. Without this necessary component, Bradlo cannot
demonstrate, as a matter of law, that he experienced severe emotional
distress.
Because Yungstein’s posts were neither extreme nor outrageous,
were not posted to intentionally inflict emotional distress, and because
Bradlo cannot prove that his reaction was reasonable, Bradlo failed to
demonstrate any element of the IIED claim. Accordingly, summary
judgment in favor of Yungstein was proper on this element.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should AFFIRM the First District Court of Appeals’
judgment in all respects. Specifically, this Court should find that Bradlo
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the claims of intrusion
upon seclusion, publicity placing a person in false light, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
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